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Abstract
In many dimensions the ability to assess knowledge depends critically on the observer's
own knowledge of that dimension. Building on this feature, this paper offers both
theoretical and empirical evidence showing that, in those tasks where multidisciplinary
knowledge is required, evaluations exhibit a similar-to-me effect: candidates who excel
in the same dimensions as the evaluator tend to be ranked relatively higher. It is also
shown that, if races or genders differ in their distribution of ability, group discrimination
will  arise  unless  evaluators  (i)  are  well  informed  about  the  extent  of  intergroup
differences and (ii) they may condition their assessments on candidates' group
belonging.
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1 Introduction
The fact that individuals might be treated di¤erently according to exogenous
characteristics such as gender, age or race has been well documented in the
literature. Most of the evidence refers to the labour market, where di¤erences
in wages or hiring and promotion that cannot be accounted for by di¤erences
in productivity have been observed.1 Discriminatory behaviours have also been
observed in housing decisions (Massey and Denton 1993), lending (Hunter and
Walker 1996), car selling (Ayres and Siegelman 1995) or even in the refereeing
of academic papers (Blank 1991; Fisher et al. 1994).
In the economics literature, two distinct general sets of explanations that
focus on the demand side of the labour market have been proposed to explain
the origin and persistence of discrimination. On the one hand, taste models,
as in Gary Becker’s (1957) seminal work, suggest a preference-based motivation
for the existence of discrimination. The di¤erence in wages between two equally
productive groups of workers arises because employers, customers or co-workers
dislike interacting with employees that belong to certain groups. On the other
hand, statistical models of discrimination argue that, in the presence of informa-
tion asymmetries about the real productivity of workers, the group-belonging
of an individual can be considered as a signal that provides additional informa-
tion. Groups of workers may di¤er in their expected productivity (Phelps 1972,
Lazear and Rosen 1990) or in the reliability of the observable signals (Aigner
and Cain 1977, Cornell and Welch 1996). In this context, taking into account
an individual’s group a¢liation may be a rational response to its informational
content and the wage gap might persist in the long run.
Independently of its origin, in general it has been considered that discrim-
inatory outcomes will decrease if hiring procedures do not allow evaluators to
observe or to take into account the identity and group belonging of candidates
(as in Blank 1991 or Golding and Rouse 2000). In this paper we show that, in
positions that require multidisciplinary knowledge, this is not true any longer.
On the contrary, in such framework a discriminatory outcome might arise unless
candidates’ group belonging can taken into account by evaluators.
In particular, within the framework of statistical discrimination models, we
propose a model which builds on the following three assumptions. First, produc-
tivity is assumed to be multidimensional. While in previous models of statistical
discrimination productivity has been typically considered unidimensional,2 as
Aigner and Cain (1977, page 176) acknowledge evaluating workers’ ability “un-
doubtedly involve(s) a number of measures”. In this paper we allow for the
existence of multiple dimensions of ability that can be understood either as
di¤erent tasks that the worker needs to undertake, or as separable skills that
are required to perform a single task. Second, while standard models of sta-
tistical discrimination assume that the accuracy with which employers assess
the productivity of potential employees is exogenous or depends on the group
1For a survey see, for instance, Altonji and Blank (1999).
2See Phelps 1972, Arrow 1973, Aigner and Cain 1977 or Cornell and Welch 1996.
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belonging of the employer and the candidate,3 here we will assume that the ca-
pability of an employer to evaluate an individual’s quality at a certain dimension
increases with her knowledge of that dimension. This assumption is consistent
with experimental evidence, where it has often been found that, in many …elds,
individuals who are less competent are also less accurate at evaluating ability
than competent ones.4 Finally, the third feature of the model is that, while all
groups of candidates are, on average, equally productive, their quality is not
necessarily the same in every dimension.
Combining these features our model yields the following two predictions.
First, we show that a similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect arises in the evaluation. Since
individuals can assess knowledge more accurately at those dimensions where
they are more knowledgeable, an employer who makes an optimal use of the
available information will give relatively more weight to those signals that are
observed in dimensions where she is most knowledgeable. As a result, given
any two equally productive candidates, the employer will tend to give a higher
valuation to the candidate who excels in the same dimensions as she does. This
result is consistent with the evidence found by Bagues et al. (2007) who observe
that, in public exams in Spain, evaluators take most into account candidates’
performance in those …elds in which they are themselves relatively more knowl-
edgeable. As a consequence, candidates have more chances of success if they are
(randomly) assigned to an evaluation committee whose members are special-
ized in those …elds where they excel. More generally, the fact that evaluators
tend to give higher ratings to candidates who are similar to themselves has
been widely documented both in psychology and sociology (Byrne 1971) and
in organizational processes, such as supervisors’ assessments of subordinates or
recruitment (Goldberg 2005). Note, however, that while in these studies sim-
ilarity is understood as similar attitudes or observable personal attributes, in
this case we argue that similarity in terms of skills may also be relevant.
Second, the model shows that when (equally productive) groups di¤er in
their distribution of ability across dimensions, the existence of a similar-to-
me-in-skills e¤ect may generate group discrimination.5 In particular, group
discrimination will arise if (i) employers are not fully aware of the extent of
these di¤erences or (ii) employers are perfectly informed but cannot condition
their evaluations on candidates’ group-belonging. The intuition behind this
result is the following. Employers will tend to give more weight to signals that
have been observed in those dimensions where they are more knowledgeable. In
principle this favours candidates belonging to the same group as the employer,
3 Ibid.
4Knowledgeable people are more accurate in their evaluations in the …eld of chess (Chi
1978), physics (Chi et al. 1982), grammar (Kruger and Dunning 1999) or academic perfor-
mance (Everson and Tobias 1998). Similarly, in the context of …rms R&D strategies, Cohen
and Levinthal (1990) argue that “the ability of a …rm to recognize the value of new, external
information, is largely a function of the …rm’s level of prior related knowledge”.
5Following Aigner and Cain (1977), we consider group discrimination as the situation where
”groups that have the same average ability may receive di¤erent average pay” (pp.178). Note
that in a multidimensional framework the term same ability should be interpreted as meaning
same total ability rather than same ability at every dimension.
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as they are more likely to excel precisely in these dimensions. Still, a well-
informed evaluator who was allowed to take into account the group belonging of
candidates might use this information in order to adjust her priors. This would
not only be e¢cient from an informational point of view but, as well, it would
yield similar average evaluations across groups of candidates.
There are many cases where such correction might not be feasible. Some-
times employers might not be fully aware of the fact that equally productive
groups di¤er in terms of how good they are in each dimension. This may happen
when groups have little interaction, when the size of the minority is relatively
small6 or in the presence of a number of cognitive biases such as observational
selection bias, availability bias or anchoring that can generate a divergence be-
tween the individual’s perception of other groups’ quality pro…les and their true
quality distribution. As well, even if evaluators are well informed, they might
not be allowed to take the group belonging of candidates into account. This
may be the result of antidiscrimination laws, according to which, sometimes,
candidates’ identity is kept anonymous or evaluators are explicitly instructed
not to take candidates’ group belonging into account. Paradoxically, our results
suggest that, if groups di¤er in their distribution of quality across dimensions,
candidates that belong to the employers’ group will tend to preferred unless
group belonging is taken into account.
Our model overcomes some of the drawbacks of standard models of statistical
discrimination (Aigner and Cain 1977, Cornell and Welch 1996). First, it relies
on more plausible assumptions. Models of statistical discrimination typically
assume that the screening technology is exogenous or depends on the group be-
longing of the candidate. In contrast, in our setup the accuracy of the evaluation
depends on the evaluator’s knowledge of each dimension, all groups of candi-
dates being evaluated with the same expected accuracy. This is consistent with
an abundant literature which …nds a positive relationship between evaluators’
knowledge of a …eld and the quality of their assessment.7 On the contrary, em-
pirical evidence supporting that the accuracy of evaluations varies over groups
of candidates is very scarce.8 Second, note that the predictions of the model
also di¤er. The above models of statistical discrimination predict that, among
highly productive candidates, those belonging to the evaluator’s group tend to
be preferred. However, the reverse does not hold and, when all candidates are
relatively unproductive, those who do not belong to the employer’s group are
favoured, given that the observed (low) signal about their quality is a weaker
indicator of their productivity. This is an uncomfortable prediction, as there is
no evidence supporting the reversal of the race and gender gap for low produc-
tivity levels. In contrast, in this multidimensional framework the evaluation bias
favours those candidates akin to the evaluator for every level of productivity.
The empirical testing of the model proposed in this paper presents very de-
6As it would increase the cost of rationality. See for instance Fryer and Jackson (2007).
7See footnote 4.
8Up to our knowledge, and according to Holzer and Neumark (2000), Neumark (1999)
provides the only empirical analysis about the reliability of the labor market information of
various groups.
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manding information requirements. First, it requires data, at each dimension,
on the quality of evaluators and candidates. Second, it needs information on
the evaluations performed. Such data is rarely observable in the labour mar-
ket. Moreover, in most observational studies it is not possible to assure that
all agents observe the same informational set. To avoid these caveats, we test
the validity of the proposed model by exploiting the evidence provided by a
well-known TV contest. In particular, we use data from The Weakest Link
TV show. In this contest players answer a number of questions over a series
of rounds. At the end of each round players are asked to vote who was the
weakest link or worst contestant of the round. The player who gets the most
votes is eliminated. A convenient feature of the Spanish version of the show is
that questions are explicitly classi…ed in di¤erent …elds. Therefore, we have a
context where productivity is multidimensional -players quality depends on how
knowledgeable they are across a number of di¤erent …elds- and where it is pos-
sible to observe individuals’ performance at each dimension and the assessment
received. Furthermore, since all contestants are candidates and evaluators at
the same time, we can also observe evaluators’ knowledge pro…le.
As predicted by the model, we observe the existence of a similar-to-me-in-
skills e¤ect. Contestants tend to give a higher valuation to those participants’
who excel in the same dimensions as themselves. We also observe that quality
distribution is correlated within age and gender groups. Interestingly, the ev-
idence shows that players take into account in their evaluations the existence
of these di¤erences across groups. Doing so is not only informationally e¢cient
but, moreover, it prevents the existence of a bias in favour of candidates that
belong to the same group as the evaluator. Our analysis thus provides unique
evidence documenting how, in some cases, allowing evaluators to take into ac-
count in their assessments candidates’ group belonging may actually prevent a
discriminatory outcome.
Our papers adds to a number of studies that have previously analyzed The
Weakest Link TV show. Février and Linnemer (2006) study players’ optimal
voting strategy using French data. Levitt (2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005)
use data from the American version of the show to empirically distinguish be-
tween di¤erent competing discrimination theories. In another paper, Antonovics
et al. (2008) use these data to determine whether the performance of contestants
is a¤ected by the gender of their opponents. Finally, using the British version,
Haan et al. (2004) have pointed out the limitations in the rationality of players’
banking decisions.
The paper is structured as follows. In the remaining of this section we o¤er
an example that helps to clarify the intuition underlying our model. Addition-
ally, another example is provided in the appendix. The formal model and the
empirical implications are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 describes the struc-
ture of The Weakest Link contest and the available data. Section 4 presents the
empirical evidence and Section 5 concludes.
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1.1 Example: The Academic Job Market
Every year, PhD candidates in Economics attend the academic job market.
There, candidates meet with employers who seek young promising researchers
that might be willing to join their faculty. A good candidate is understood as
someone who will be able to make a relevant scienti…c contribution, typically in
the form of an academic publication. However, the true quality of a candidate
cannot be immediately disclosed and several years may be necessary in order
to assess the importance of the contribution. In the meantime, the main signal
that the evaluator can observe about the candidate’s quality will be her job
market paper.9
Evaluating a job market paper is in general a multidimensional task. First,
a good paper should provide an interesting and novel economic idea. Second, it
is usually expected that this idea is presented through an elegant mathematical
formalization. Evaluating each of these dimensions is likely to be complex and
evaluators usually will be able to assess more accurately the quality of the
paper in that dimension where they are themselves more knowledgeable10 . For
instance, while evaluating the novelty of a paper requires knowledge of the
previous related literature, in order to appreciate its mathematical quality being
skilled in mathematics might be highly convenient.
Following with the example, let us assume for simplicity that the total quality
of a paper is equal to the sum of its quality in the above two dimensions:
its quality in terms of economic novelty and relevance plus its quality at the
mathematical dimension. Let us also imagine the extreme case of an evaluator
who is perfectly knowledgeable in mathematics but is completely ignorant of
the literature. In this case, given the evaluator’s incapability to appreciate
the economic novelty of the paper, an optimal evaluation would involve taking
mostly into account the information that she observes along the mathematical
dimension. Therefore, faced with two papers of identical quality, the evaluator
would tend to give a higher valuation to the paper which excels relatively more
in the mathematical dimension.
Moreover, imagine that there exist gender di¤erences in the distribution of
ability across dimensions. Consider, for instance, a scenario where the (total)
quality of papers is independent of the author’s gender but, still, where male
economists tend to have a higher capability for mathematical abstraction, while
female economists are better in terms of the economic relevance of their work.
Then, the above similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect could also generate gender discrim-
ination. The intuition is the following. If evaluators are unaware of the existence
of these gender di¤erences or, even if they are aware, they are not allowed to
condition their assessments on candidates’ gender, then the evaluators’ opti-
9As Levinovitz and Ringertz (2001) point out, ”it usually takes a longer time in economics
(and social sciences in general) than in the natural sciences to …nd out if a new contribution
is solid or if it is just a fad. In other words, it is important to wait for scrutiny, criticism and
repeated tests of the quality and relevance of a contribution.”
10The fact that a paper’s evaluation may depend heavily on the characteristics of the eval-
uator is illustrated by the low correlation -only 0.24- that Blank (1991) found in the ratings
given by the two referees of papers submitted to the American Economic Review.
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mal evaluation will involve giving more weight to information that is observed
along the dimension where they excel. This will favour candidates belonging
to the same gender as the evaluator, as they are more likely to excel in that
dimension. For instance, if the employer was male, papers produced by male
candidates would tend to obtain a higher valuation since the (male) evaluator’s
optimal evaluation involves giving a higher consideration to the information
observed across the mathematical dimension. Naturally, gender discrimination
would disappear if the evaluator was well informed about the existence of such
gender di¤erences in the distribution of quality and, most importantly, was
allowed to take candidates’ gender into consideration.
2 The model
We build on the standard model of statistical discrimination presented by Phelps
(1972) where an employer must select a candidate out of a pool of applicants
in a context of imperfect information. Our main departure from the traditional
framework is (1) to allow for the existence of multiple dimensions of ability and
(2) to make the accuracy of the evaluation at each dimension depend on the
evaluators’ knowledge of this dimension.
Let us consider the case of an individual whose total quality depends on
his abilities or skills in a number D of di¤erent dimensions or …elds [qi =
f(xi1; :::; xiD)]. These …elds can be understood as di¤erent tasks that the worker
needs to undertake or as separable skills that are required to perform a single
task. Candidates’ abilities are exogenously given and independently and nor-
mally distributed,
xi ! N (pi;§)
where xi represents the Dx1 vector of abilities, pi is a Dx1 vector of mean
abilities and § is the corresponding variance-covariance matrix.
Without loss of generality, we impose two simplifying assumptions on the
populational distribution of quality. First, we restrict the variance of quality to
be equal across dimensions and normalize it equal to one. With this constraint
we want to avoid a more general case where ability may vary systematically
more along certain dimensions.
V ar (xid) = 1 8d = 1; :::;D
Second, we assume that an individual’s ability along a certain …eld is inde-
pendent of his ability along any other dimension. In other words, the knowledge
of an individual’s ability in one dimension does not provide any information
about his ability in any other dimension.11
E (xidxid0) = 0 8d 6 =d0
11As long as there exists some kind of multidimensionality, this is, provided that quality
in di¤erent dimensions is not perfectly correlated, dimensions could always be appropriately
rede…ned such that this condition is satis…ed.
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These two assumptions restrict § to be a diagonal matrix where the on-the-
diagonal elements are equal to one.
In this multidimensional framework let us consider the case where individu-
als’ total productivity is not observable but evaluators can observe some noisy
and imperfect signal of candidates’ ability at each dimension. These signals
could be interpreted as the result of some tests or job interviews and their value
will be a function of the candidates’ true ability at each speci…c …eld plus an
error term ´ which is assumed to be independently and normally distributed
with zero mean and …nite variance.
yid = xid + ´id where ´id ! N
¡
0; ¾´d
¢
Moreover, let us assume that in each dimension the accuracy of the signal is
independent of the quality of the candidate who is being evaluated.
E (xid´id) = 0
Given the above assumptions, evaluator h will infer the quality of candidate
i in dimension d as the weighted sum of the signal observed in this dimension
and the distributional prior, where the weight given to the signal will depend
on how accurately this signal is perceived by the evaluator:
Eh (xid=yid) = °
h
dyid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pid (1)
where pid = E (xid) and °hd =
Eh(xidyid)
Eh(yidyid)
= 11+¾
´h
d
. If, for simplicity, we
assume that a candidate’s total productivity is equal to the sum of his quality
at each dimension
·
qi = f (xi1; :::; xiD) =
P
d2D
xid
¸
, it follows that:
Eh (qi=yi1; :::; yiD) =
X
d2D
£
°hdyid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pid
¤
This is, employer h will take relatively more into account those signals that
she observes in …elds where she can assess information more accurately.
2.1 Similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect
Let us de…ne an evaluation as being complex as the situation where an evalu-
ator’s relative ability to assess quality is positively related to her own quality.
More precisely, in a context where, without loss of generality, D is equal to two,
we de…ne an evaluation as being complex if:
xh1 > xh2 =) ¾´h1 < ¾´h2 (2)
It easily follows that when the evaluation is complex, an evaluator who
makes an optimal use of the available information will give a larger weight to
those signals that have been observed in that dimension where her own ability
is larger. This is, given an evaluator h,
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xh1 > xh2 =) °h1 > °h2
As a result, faced with two equally productive candidates i and j, evaluator
h will tend to give a higher evaluation to the candidate who excels in the same
dimension where she herself is best. More precisely,
Proposition 1 Similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect
qi = qj, xh1 > xh2 & xi1 > xj1 ) Eh [qi] > Eh [qj ]
Proof. The evaluator h, who observes at each dimension d a noisy signal
of quality, can use yd as a least-squares predictor of the candidate’s true ability
in that dimension, xd; according to the regression-type relation xd = °hdyd +¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pid + ud where E [ydud] = 0 and coe¢cient °hd will be determined by
the accuracy of the signal
h
¾
´hd
i
[as in equation (1)]. The evaluator’s expected
valuation of candidate i’s total productivity will be equal to:
Eh [qi] = Eh [xi1 + xi2] = Eh
24 X
d=1;2
¡
°hdyid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pd
¢35 = X
d=1;2
¡
°hdxid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pd
¢
Candidate j’s productivity can be estimated in a similar way. The di¤erence in
the expected observed quality of the two candidates is equal to:
Eh [qi]¡Eh [qj ] =
X
d=1;2
¡
°hdxid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pd
¢¡ X
d=1;2
¡
°hdxjd +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pd
¢
=
X
d=1;2
°hd (xid ¡ xjd)
which is positive since qi = qj =) xi1 ¡ xj1 = xj2 ¡ xi2 > 0 and xh1 >
xh2 =) °h1 > °h2 :
2.2 In-group bias
As shown above, when productivity is multidimensional and the evaluation is
complex, evaluators are more likely to give a higher evaluation to candidates
alike to them. In this subsection we investigate whether the existence of this
similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect can generate an in-group bias. This is, if individuals
belonging to the same group tend to possess knowledge in the same dimensions,
will evaluators have a tendency to prefer group mates over equally productive
candidates from other groups? As we will see, it depends on whether the eval-
uator is well informed about the extent of inter-group di¤erences and whether
she is allowed to take them into account.
Consider that individuals may belong to di¤erent groups de…ned according
to gender, age, or some other easily observable and exogenous characteristic.
Let us also consider the case where there are only two groups g1 and g2 and
where candidates’ total productivity is independent of group belonging:
E [qi=i 2 g1] = q(g1) = q(g2) = E [qj=j 2 g2] (3)
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This assumption does not prevent the possibility that members of the two
groups tend to excel in di¤erent dimensions. More particularly, let us represent
the existence of group-related variations in the distribution of quality in the
following way:
xid =
X
g=g1;g2
x
(g)
id + ¹id d = 1; 2:
where x(g)id =
³
p
(g)
d + "id
´
c
(g)
i and c
(g)
i = 1 if candidate i belongs to group g
and zero otherwise. Let us also assume that ¹id and "id are normally and inde-
pendently distributed with zero mean. Therefore, x(g)id measures the di¤erences
in dimension d that can be explained by the candidate’s belonging to group g,
and p(g)d is the expected ability in dimension d of individuals in group g. Finally,
let us, for simplicity, consider the case where the distribution of quality across
groups is symmetric so that the following condition is satis…ed:
p
(g1)
1 = p
(g2)
2 & p
(g1)
2 = p
(g2)
1 (4)
In this set up, evaluators will estimate candidates’ quality in a similar way as
in (1). Let us de…ne ¸id = ¹id+
P
g=g1;g2
"idc
(g)
i and zid =
P
g=g1;g2
p
(g)
d c
(g)
i . Therefore
xid = zid +¸id and, given that yid = xid + ´id, it follows that in each dimension
the relationship between quality and signal, net of the group e¤ect, will be equal
to xid ¡ zid = °hd (yid ¡ zid) + uid. Thus, Eh (xid) = Eh
£
°hdyid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
zid
¤
where °hd =
V ar(¸id)
V ar(¸id)+V ar(´id)
= ¾¸¾¸+¾
´h
d
:
In our analysis we will distinguish between two possible situations. First,
we present the case where in their evaluation employers may take into account
candidates’ observable signals of quality but do not condition their evaluation
on candidates’ group belonging. Second, we study the case where the eval-
uators condition their evaluation both on the observed signals of quality and
candidates’ group belonging.
2.2.1 Non-discriminatory practices
Let us de…ne as non-discriminatory practices those situations where evaluators
do not condition their evaluation on candidates’ group belonging [8i8d Eh (zid) = pd].
Several reasons may prevent evaluators from taking into account the group be-
longing of candidates. Evaluators may not be aware of the existence of dif-
ferences in quality pro…les across groups. As well, even if evaluators are well
informed about these di¤erences, they may be restricted not to use this infor-
mation. This is the case, for instance, in many …rms and institutions where the
hiring process is subject to a strict equal opportunities policy.
Paradoxically, when members of di¤erent groups are, on average, equally
productive but di¤er in their distribution of ability, if the evaluator does not or
cannot take into account candidates’ group belonging, individuals belonging to
her own group will tend to be favoured.
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Proposition 2 Non-discriminatory practices yield discriminatory outcomes
q(g1) = q(g2), p(g1)d 6= p(g2)d & Eh (zid) = Eh (zjd) = zd =)
=) Eh (qi) > Eh (qj) i; h 2 g1; j 2 g2; d = 1; 2:
Proof. Without loss of generality let us assume that members of group g1
tend to excel in dimension one
h
p
(g1)
1 > p
(g1)
2
i
: Let us also for simplicity consider
the case where the evaluator h is a typical group g1 member such that xh1 > xh2,
so that from assumption (2) it follows that °(h)1 > °
(h)
2 . Then,
Eh (qi)¡Eh (qj) = Eh
24 X
d=1;2
¡
°hdyid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
zid
¢35¡Eh
24 X
d=1;2
¡
°hdyjd +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
zjd
¢35 =
= fEh (zid) = Eh (zjd) = pdg =
X
d=1;2
³
°hdp
(g1)
d +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pd
´
¡
X
d=1;2
³
°hdp
(g2)
d +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pd
´
=
=
X
d=1;2
h
°hd
³
p
(g1)
d ¡ p(g2)d
´i
= fby (4)g = (°(h)1 ¡ °(h)2 )(¹x(g)1 ¡ ¹x(g)2 ) > 0
This is, in a framework where evaluating is complex, if groups di¤er in
their distribution of quality and evaluators do not take into account group-
belonging, they will assign a higher valuation to those candidates that excel in
the same dimensions as they do and, since the distribution of ability across …elds
is group dependent, this bias will tend to favour candidates that belong to the
same group as the evaluator. This is, not taking into account group priors is
not only informationally suboptimal but, moreover, it generates discriminatory
outcomes.
2.2.2 Discriminatory Practices
If employers observe that employees belonging to certain groups tend to perform
better on certain dimensions, it is likely that these employers will update their
beliefs and they will take into account this information in their evaluations, at
least, as long as they are allowed to do so. If the evaluator can condition her
evaluation both on the observed quality signals and on the group belonging of
the candidates, then any two equally productive candidates will tend to obtain
the same valuations independently of group belonging.
Proposition 3 Discriminatory practices yield non-discriminatory outcomes
q(g1) = q(g2), p(g1)d 6= p(g2)d , Eh (zid) = p(g1)d & Eh (zjd) = p(g2)d =)
=) Eh (qi) > Eh (qj) i; h 2 g1; j 2 g2; d = 1; 2:
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Proof. As in proposition (1), without loss of generality let us assume that
members of group g1 tend to excel in dimension one
h
p
(g1)
1 > p
(g1)
2
i
and let us
also for simplicity consider the case where the evaluator h is a typical group
g1 member such that xh1 > xh2, so that from assumption (2) it follows that
°
(h)
1 > °
(h)
2 . Then,
Eh (qi)¡Eh (qj) = Eh
24 X
d=1;2
¡
°hdyid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
zid
¢35¡Eh
24 X
d=1;2
¡
°hdyjd +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
zjd
¢35 =
=
X
d=1;2
³
°hdp
(g1)
d +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
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´
¡
X
d=1;2
³
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d +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
p
(g2)
d
´
= q(g1)¡q(g2) = 0
This is, if well-informed employers may condition their evaluation on the
group belonging of candidates the outcome of evaluations will be independent
of the evaluators’ group belonging.
Let us summarize the empirical implications of the proposed model. First,
the model predicts that when productivity is multidimensional and the eval-
uation is complex, evaluators will tend to take most into account information
provided along those dimensions where they are more knowledgeable. As a
result, evaluators will tend to give relatively higher valuations to those candi-
dates who excel in the same dimensions as they do (Proposition 1). Second, the
model predicts that if the di¤erent groups, although equally productive, tend to
excel in di¤erent dimensions, an in-group bias may arise such that candidates
belonging to the evaluators’ group will tend to obtain higher valuations. In par-
ticular, this same-group e¤ect will arise if the evaluator does not condition her
evaluation on the candidates’ group membership (Proposition 2). This might
happen if the evaluator is not well informed about the existence of group di¤er-
ences or if she is not allowed to take candidates’ group belonging into account.
However, if a well-informed optimal evaluator is allowed to take into account
group-belonging information in her evaluation, not only will the accuracy of the
evaluation be higher but there will be no group bias (Proposition 3).
3 The Weakest Link
We test the validity of the model using data from a TV show: The Weakest
Link . In this game, contestants must answer questions belonging to a number
of di¤erent …elds over a series of rounds. Then, after each round, each contestant
is asked to declare which player was the weakest link. Thus, since candidates
are themselves evaluators, it is possible to observe a proxy of their quality at
each dimension and to study how this a¤ects their assessments.
A fortunate feature speci…c to the Spanish version of The Weakest Link is
the fact that questions are explicitly classi…ed according to well de…ned cate-
gories. A computer selects randomly each subsequent question out of a database
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of 60,000 questions. Note that, since questions are randomly chosen, total qual-
ity can be considered as an additive function of quality across each dimension.
Last but not least, using this set up has the advantage that in the game all
evaluators observe the same information at the time of their decision and, most
importantly, it guarantees that all evaluators share the same objective function,
which is common knowledge. These are important features, as they allow to rule
out the possibility that players di¤er in their assessments because they have ac-
cess to di¤erent information or because they do not share the same objective
function. Thus, it allows to discard a competing alternative hypothesis which
also would explain why people tend to give more weight to that information
which is observed in those dimensions where they are best at. In particular,
if people di¤ered in their assessment of which is the true importance of each
dimension then individuals would invest more in human capital in those dimen-
sions that they consider more important and, for a similar reason, they would
also give a higher valuation to those candidates that excelled in those same
dimensions.
Studies that use data from TV shows tend to be subject to several drawbacks.
Individuals in the sample are not likely to be representative of the population.
This sample bias is due both to individuals’ self-selecting decision to apply to be
in the show and from organizers’ decisions regarding who is chosen.12 As well,
this program is broadcast on the national television and this may induce indi-
viduals to adopt politically correct attitudes, posing critical trouble for studies
that attempt to identify discrimination. However, these caveats are less likely
to a¤ect the objective of our analysis: to estimate how an evaluators’ relative
knowledge of each …eld a¤ects her assessments.
Below we describe the rules of the game, we present the information avail-
able in our database and then we analyze the factors that a¤ect contestants
performance and voting decisions.
3.1 The game
The game starts with nine contestants who have to work together as a team to
build prize money of up to 7200 Euros. The show is divided in nine timed rounds.
The …rst round lasts three minutes and each subsequent round is 10 seconds
shorter. Within each round players take turns answering questions attempting
to create a chain of correct answers. In particular, questions are asked to each
player following a clockwise order until the time limit is exhausted.13 A feature
speci…c to the Spanish version of The Weakest Link is the fact that questions can
belong twenty well de…ned categories.14 Before hearing the question a player can
make a banking decision in order to secure the amount of money in the chain.
12The show receives around 6000 applications each month, of which only 200 can be selected.
One of the explicit criteria used to select participants for their show is their performance in a
test trial.
13The …rst round starts with the contestant whose name is …rst by alphabetical order. From
the second round on the best player of the previous round is the …rst to be questioned.
14Before asking any question the host indicates explicitly to which subject the question
belongs.
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If he does not bank and answers correctly, this increases the prize. Should he
fail to give a correct answer, the chain falls back to zero. Immediately after
each question is answered the host informs whether the answer was correct. A
correct answer yields a link in a prize chain, beginning at zero and climbing to
800 Euros in nine increments. At the end of each round, players are asked to
write in a blackboard who they think was the worst player in the round (”who
is the weakest link?”). The voting is done simultaneously and then made public
to all contestants. The player who gets the largest number of votes is eliminated
from the game and leaves with no money. In the case of a tie, the strongest
link decides which of the tied players is eliminated. By the end of round 7 only
two contestants remain in the game and then play another round as a team to
increase the …nal prize. In round 9 they compete head-to-head and the winner
takes all the money accumulated during the show.
3.2 The data
Our dataset contains information on 103 episodes of The Weakest Link TV
show that were broadcast in Spain between November 2002 and February 2004.
The data were collected by video recording the episodes. In total, our data
base covers information on the personal characteristics, the performance and
the voting decisions corresponding to the 927 individuals who participated in
the 103 programs recorded.
As it has been argued by previous works, while in the early stages of the game
individuals’ best strategy is to vote against players who they truly considered
performed badly, as the game progresses, incentives may change as in the …nal
round the two remaining contestants have to compete to get the prize (Levitt
2004, Février and Linnemer 2006). Also, the composition of the team in all
rounds but the …rst will be endogenously determined by past voting decisions.
Hence, to avoid these problems, our empirical analysis will consider only the
…rst round of the show.15
3.2.1 Personal characteristics
Summary statistics at the contestant level are presented in Table 1.16 Around
46% of players that participated in the show were female. This …gure corre-
sponds approximately to the calls and presentations to castings received.17 The
average age of contestants is around 36.8 years. In what follows we denominate
younger/older players those below/above this age. According to this de…nition,
in the game there around 29.1 % young females, 16.8% old females, 25.4% young
males and 28.7% old males.
We also classify contestants according to their education level in …ve rough
groups: less than high school, high school graduate, college graduate, student
15Results, available upon request, are essentially the same when we consider all rounds.
16At the beginning of the show players introduce themselves and generally report their age,
their education and/or their occupation.
17 Information provided in a personal conversation with the producer of the show.
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and not known.18 About 37% of the contestants are classi…ed as college edu-
cated. With respect to the Spanish population, participants in the TV show are
younger and better educated.19
3.2.2 Performance
The average player answers 59.1% of the questions correctly (see Table 2). Table
3 presents the distribution of contestants according to the number of questions
asked and answered correctly. Most players are asked three questions (73%) and
the mode was answering two out of these three questions correctly in the …rst
round. Only around 19% of players manage to answer every question correctly
and, on the contrary, only 7% do not manage to get a single question right.
Performance varies across di¤erent types of players (see Table 4). The rate
of success is higher for men than for women (60.6% and 57.3%, respectively)
and although this gap is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at standard levels.
Performance does not di¤er either signi…cantly by age: the rate of success for
players aged 36 or younger is 58.8%, very close to the 59.5% average obtained
by contestants that are 37 or older. Within gender-age groups we observe again
slight di¤erences that are these di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant. Old
female overcome younger ones (58.1% vs 56.8%) while, within males, young ones
perform better (61.1% vs 60.2%). Signi…cant di¤erences are observed, though,
across di¤erent educational groups. People that do not report neither their
education nor their occupation perform the worst (51.8%), while people with
college education tend to do best (62.2%).
We also observe signi…cant di¤erences in the di¢culty of each …eld. While in
…elds such as Music or Literature players manage on average to answer correctly
only 50.3% and 52.5% of the questions, the success rate in other dimensions
such as Sports is 71%. Moreover, the relative knowledge of each …eld varies
depending on the candidates’ gender and age. Old men answer are relatively
better than the average contestant at answering questions on subjects such as
History (71% vs 54.4%), Politics (70% vs 62.9%) and Custom (73.1% vs 61.3%)
and young men excel in Sports (79.7% vs 71%) and Entertainment (87.5% vs
64.7%). Among female, young ones are relatively better at Music (63.2% vs
53.9%) and Children (80.8% vs 72.7%) and old female stand out in …elds such
as at Gastronomy (68.4% vs 56.5%) or Religion (80% vs 60.2%).
4 What determines voting decisions?
At the end of each round players are asked who, according to them, was the
weakest link of the round. As pointed out above, previous studies of The Weak-
est Link have shown that in the …rst round players’ best response to this question
18 In those cases where education was not reported, we have imputed the educational level
that seemed most likely given the reported occupation. Whenever neither education neither
occupation was reported players were assigned to the ”not known” group.
19 In Spain in 2004 the average age was 40.4 and around 28.2% of the population had attained
tertiary education (OCDE, Education at a Glance, 2007).
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is to truly declare who they consider was the worst contestant (Février and Lin-
nemer 2006). However, evaluating contestants’ ability presents several problems.
First, the available information is scarce, as each player only gets to answer a
few questions. Second, note that the …rst round lasts three minutes and on
average 29 questions are answered, this is, one question is answered every six
seconds. Given the speed of the game, it may be sometimes hard for players to
remember other players’ performance. Third, although the host reveals whether
the question was answered correctly or not, not all questions provide the same
information about an individual’s quality, as not all the questions entail the
same di¢culty.
In fact, our data show that most players do not agree about who is the
weakest link and, in general, votes tend to be spread. Only in …ve occasions
out of the 103 sessions that compose our database the same contestant was
voted as the weakest link by all the other players. On average, the most voted
contestant gets slightly below …ve votes. The inexistence of a clear consensus
raises the issue of how voting decisions are made, why voters tend to di¤er in
their assessments of quality and whether group belonging plays a role.
Statistical discrimination models, as the one proposed above [see equation
(1)], suggest that evaluators make assessments taking into account both the
observed performance and their priors about candidates’ quality, giving a weight
to each piece of information proportional to its informative content. As well,
contestants’ personal characteristics may themselves in‡uence voting decisions
in the presence of taste discrimination.
We specify the utility that player h obtains from voting against player i as
follows:
Uhi = fh (zi;yi;pi;) = ® + ¯zi +
1
Ni
X
d2D
£
°hdyid +
¡
1 ¡ °hd
¢
pid
¤
+ ²hi (5)
where the set of covariates zi captures contestant i’s personal characteristics;
Ni is the total number of questions that contestant i was asked; D is the total
number of …elds to which the question could belong; yid represents the number
of questions belonging to …eld d that individual i answered correctly; pid re‡ects
the evaluator’s priors about contestant’s i quality in dimension d; °hd measures
the weight that the evaluator gives to the observed signals and, …nally, ²hi is the
unobserved utility individual h obtains for voting against contestant i. Given
this general speci…cation, to carry out our analysis we estimate a conditional
logit of the probability that contestants vote against other players. Under the
assumption that the ²hi ’s are distributed i.i.d. extreme value, the probability of
player h voting against contestant i is given by:
Phi =
exp [fh (zi;yi;pi;)]
CP
i=1
exp [fh (zi;yi;pi;)]
where C is the number of contestants in the round.
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As Antonovics et al. (2005) point out, the advantage of using a conditional
logit in this context is threefold. First, the characteristics and performance of
all contestants will in‡uence the probability that individual h votes against any
one contestant. Second, the conditional logit allows us to examine interactions
between the characteristics of the individual whose vote is being considered
and the other contestants. Third, the predicted number of votes cast by each
contestant is constrained to be one and therefore the total number of predicted
votes cast in a round equals the number of contestants in the round.
4.1 Baseline model
Let us …rst assume a baseline case where (i) all questions are equally taken into
account, independently of their …eld and independently of the characteristics of
the observer
£8h; 8d; °hd = °¤ and (ii) the priors held by evaluators do not vary
across dimensions and individuals [8i; 8d; pid = p]. Our initial speci…cation (5)
is then reduced to:
Uhi = a + bzi + °
X
d2D
yid
Ni
+ ²hi (6)
This speci…cation, which measures players’ performance as the share of ques-
tions that have been answered correctly, is similar to the one used in previous
studies that have analyzed voting behaviour in The Weakest Link (Levitt 2004,
Antonovics et al. 2005).
Results from running regression (6) are reported in column 1 of Table 6.
As personal characteristics we have included gender, age and educational level.
We also control for the position where the contestant was located during the
game and for the distance between players. In the game, contestants stand in
a semicircle around the host. The physical distance between two players may
be relevant, as a close distance could foster collusive behavior or increase the
psychological cost of voting against each other. To measure distance, we number
contestants from 1 to 9 and then compute the di¤erence between these numbers.
By construction, this variable varies between 1 and 8.
Con…rming our expectations and also consistent with previous studies, a
lower proportion of correct answers in the …rst round increases the probability
of being voted out. Contestants are also more likely to vote against players
who are located further away. Also, contestants who were asked a larger num-
ber of questions are more likely to receive a vote. This is consistent with an
information-based theory, as a greater amount of questions answered diminishes
the uncertainty about an individual’s true quality (Cornell and Welch 1996).
Also, as in Raghubir and Valenzuela (2006), we …nd evidence of a position ef-
fect.
While gender is not itself a relevant factor determining the voting decisions,
older (younger) females have a greater (lower) probability of receiving a vote.
This is consistent with the descriptive information presented in column 2 of
table 4. Old women receive a signi…cantly higher proportion of votes than
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the other three groups: old male, young male and young female. Given that
older women’s overall performance is not lower than that of young females,
this evidence suggests that old females are treated relatively worse than young
ones. Finally, higher levels of education are associated with a lower probability
of receiving a vote, consistent with the idea that highly educated players are
perceived as strong players even after controlling for performance.
These results di¤er partly from those found in previous studies that used
data from other countries. For instance, Levitt (2004) observes that in the US
older contestants are more likely to be voted but he …nds no evidence of gender
discrimination. On the other hand, Antonovics et al.(2005), using also American
data, …nd evidence of female players discriminating against male ones. Finally,
Février and Linnemer (2006) …nd, using French data, that gender and age do
not have any in‡uence on the probability of being voted out.
4.2 Similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect
In speci…cation (6) the weight that evaluators give to signals, °hd , is not allowed
to vary across dimensions or across evaluators. However, Proposition 1 claims
that, when the evaluation is complex an evaluator who makes an optimal use
of the available information will give relatively more weight to signals that are
obtained in those …elds where she is relatively more knowledgeable. As a conse-
quence, given two equally productive candidates, she will tend to give a higher
valuation to the one who excels in the same dimensions as she does.
How complex are evaluations in The Weakest Link? The host reports whether
an answer is correct, which facilitates players’ evaluation. However, given that
not all questions are equally di¢cult, a wrong answer may reveal bad quality or
just re‡ect bad luck and, similarly, a correct answer may signal quality of the
candidate or just be the consequence of good fortune. Therefore, being knowl-
edgeable in a …eld might help to assess how informative an answer is about the
quality of the player.20
Testing proposition 1 requires information on evaluators’ relative quality
at each …eld. It is possible to infer individuals’ quality at each dimension by
exploiting the information provided by players’ performance during the game.
In particular, we can proxy individual h’s quality in dimension d using the share
of questions that she has answered correctly in that dimension during the game:
bqhd =
RhP
r=1
yhdr
RhP
r=1
nhdr
where r stands for round, Rh indicates the total number of rounds that
player h participated in the game; yhdr represents the total number of questions
20Antonovics et al. (2005) already argue that, in The Weakest Link, women (men) might be
”better able to identify the types of questions that women (men) should be able to answer cor-
rectly”. However, they model this using a standard (unidimensional) statistical discrimination
model.
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belonging to …eld d that contestant h answered correctly in round r; and nhd
indicates the number of questions belonging to …eld d that contestant h was
asked in round r.
If we assume the existence of a linear relationship between an individual’s
knowledge and her evaluation accuracy, then an evaluator’s relative accuracy
at evaluating dimension d can be proxied by °hd =
bqhdP
a2D
bqha .21 Building on this
measure, evaluator h will estimate individual i0s performance as being equal to:
Eh (qi) =
X
d2D
°hdyid (7)
We denominate this measure observed performance. Note that since
P
d2D
°hd =
1, the observed performance is in expected value very similar to the share of
questions answered correctly (see Table 2, rows 1 & 2).22
Additionally, we introduce as a control the type of questions that the player
was asked. As expected, observed performance has a negative e¤ect on the
voting decisions (Table 6, column 2). In addition to the number of questions
answered correctly, the empirical evidence con…rms that individuals are less
likely to cast votes against contestants with a similar knowledge pro…le. This
is consistent with Proposition 1, which predicts that evaluators tend to prefer
candidates that excel in the same dimensions where they excel.
Will the existence of a similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect yield an in group bias?
In the next section we deal with this issue.
4.3 In-group bias
As it is shown in Table 5, there exist considerable di¤erences in the distribution
of quality across gender-age groups. Therefore, by construction, the variable
observed performance should then be higher when both evaluator and candidate
belong to the same group. The evidence supports this claim (see Table 7, column
1). The result also holds if we control for individual …xed e¤ects (column 2).
21Given that quality at each dimension ranges between 0 and 1, one might consider also a
Beta distribution with parameters ad; bd. With this speci…cation, the weight that evaluator
h gives to signal d would be equal to:
°d =
ad+
RhP
r=1
yhdr
ad+bd+
RhP
r=1
nhdr0B@ P
d2D
ad+
RhP
r=1
yhdr
ad+bd+
RhP
r=1
nhdr
1CA =D
Results, available upon request, do not change if we use this alternative speci…cation.
22Note also that as the observed performance has been built using the information provided
by players’ answers in the game, this measure will tend to be more precise for evaluators who
remain longer in the show.
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Propositions 2 and 3 show that when the distribution of ability di¤ers across
groups of candidates, whether the existence of a similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect
generates an in-group bias depends on the following two conditions: (i) eval-
uators can condition their evaluation on candidates’ group-belonging and (ii)
evaluators are fully aware of the extent of intergroup di¤erences.
If these two conditions are satis…ed, our theoretical framework suggests that
evaluators will take into account the available prior information about the exis-
tence of inter-group di¤erences. This is informationally optimal and, moreover,
in so doing players correct the in-group bias that would otherwise arise. Any
available prior information about the relative quality of each group at each di-
mension should be considered, as it a¤ects the information which is provided
by a correct or a wrong answer. The intuition is easy: it does not provide much
new information to observe an individual missing a question in a …eld which,
anyway, members of his group tend to be unaware of. Similarly, it is not in-
formative to observe an individual getting a right answer in a …eld where the
evaluator already knows that members of his group are very knowledgeable.
While condition (i) is clearly satis…ed in the game -players can observe the
identity and group belonging of other participants- whether the evaluators are
fully aware of the existence of signi…cant di¤erences in the distribution of quality
across groups [condition (ii)] remains an empirical issue. In order to test if this
condition is satis…ed, we allow for a more general speci…cation where priors are
allowed to vary both across dimensions and across groups. In this case for any
candidate i that belongs to group g, pid = pgd =
P
i2g
yidP
i2g
nid
where
P
i2g
nid denotes the
number of questions belonging to …eld d that members of group g were asked
and
P
i2g
yid measures how many of them they answered correctly. If we consider
these priors, the best estimation evaluator h can do about player i0s quality is
given by:
Eh (qi;pg1; :::; pgd) =
X
d2D
[°hdyid + (1 ¡ °hd)pgd] =
X
d2D
°hd (yid ¡ pgd) + pgd (8)
which we name observed performance with group priors. Results from adding
this variable to our original speci…cation are presented in column 3 of Table 6.
This measure has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on the voting decision.23
Furthermore, the Bayesian information criterion suggests that this speci…cation
of the model is better than the previous one.24
23The following anecdotical interpretation of this results might be done. If, for instance, a
young male contestant fails to give a correct answer in a typically old female question (e.g.
religion) this might be not considered as such a strong signal of low productivity as if the
same mistake was made by an old female player. Hence, given two players that belong to
two equally good groups and who obtained the same rate of correct answers, the one who
answered correctly in …elds where he was expected to be less knowledgeable is less likely to
be voted out. Alternatively, the contestant who failed to answer questions in relatively (for
his group) easy …elds is more likely to receive a vote.
24The Bayesian information criterion of the model goes down from 3060.7 to 3058.5, indi-
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These results suggest that players bear in mind the fact that the distribution
of knowledge varies across gender and age groups and, consistently, adjust the
information provided by signals. This means that the predictions of proposi-
tion 3 should apply. This is, when well informed evaluators take into account
candidates’ group belonging the existence of a similar-to-me-skills e¤ect does
not generate an in-group bias. In order to test this hypothesis we construct a
dummy which takes value one if both evaluator and candidate belong to the
same age and gender group and zero otherwise, and we add this dummy to the
model speci…ed in equation (6).
When we include this dummy in our baseline model, the coe¢cient is not
signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (see Table 6, column 4). This is, even if the
people that look alike to the evaluator in terms of skills tend to be favoured and
people within the same group tend to excel in the same dimensions, we do not
observe an in-group bias.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we extend the standard model of statistical discrimination to a
multidimensional framework where the accuracy of evaluators at a each …eld is
related to how knowledgeable they are in that …eld. The model yields two main
results. First, it rationalizes the existence of a similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect which
favours candidates who excel in the same dimensions as the evaluator. The intu-
ition is the following. Given that in this framework it is rational for employers
to give more weight to signals observed in those …elds where they are more
skilled, candidates who stand out in these dimensions tend to obtain relatively
higher evaluations. Second, the model casts doubts on the capability of blind
evaluations to eradicate discrimination. It is shown that, if groups of individuals
-according to their gender, race or any other observable and exogenously given
characteristic- di¤er in their distribution of ability across dimensions, group dis-
crimination will arise unless evaluators are well informed about the extent of
these di¤erences and, moreover, they can condition their assessments on can-
didates’ group belonging. This is, when evaluations are multidimensional and
complex, hiding the identity of candidates may actually penalize those candi-
dates that do not belong to the evaluators’ group.
We use data from the Spanish version of The Weakest Link TV show to test
the main predictions of the model. As expected, we observe a similar-to-me-in-
skills e¤ect. In their voting decisions, even if all questions are equally valuable,
players are more likely to vote against contestants who performed relatively
worse in those …elds where they themselves excel. We also observe the existence
of signi…cant di¤erences in the knowledge pro…le of di¤erent gender-age groups.
However, the similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect does not generate an in-group bias.
Our analysis suggests that this is due to the fact that players are well informed
about the existence of di¤erences in the knowledge pro…le of di¤erent groups
and take this information into account in their assessments. In this respect,
cating a better …t.
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it provides exceptional evidence showing that the observability of candidates’
identity might, in some cases, reduce discrimination.
22
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Appendix A
The Case of Early Arrivers and Late Leavers
Let us imagine a job where workers’ total productivity (q) is just proportional
to the number of hours worked and where the total amount of time worked by a
worker is equal to the number of hours that elapse between her time of arrival (a)
and her time of departure (d) [q = k (d ¡ a) ;k > 0]. Let us also assume that in-
dividuals cannot choose their arrival and departure times strategically, but these
are …xed idiosyncratic characteristics, which are independently and uniformly
distributed among the population
£
a ! u (a; a) and ! u ¡d; d¢ ; where a < d¤.
For simplicity let us also consider that an individual’s arrival and departure
times are independent [E (a ¢ d) = 0] and distributed with equal variance£a ¡ a = d ¡ d¤ :
Finally, let us assume that the manager can only observe if an employee was
working at a certain time if she was herself working at that very same moment.
This is, if, for instance, the manager arrives at work at 10 a.m. and …nds some
employees already in the o¢ce, it is not possible for her to know exactly how
long they have been there. Similarly, if the manager leaves the o¢ce at 6 p.m.
and somebody else remains, she cannot know how much longer he will stay. In
other words, in this example the accuracy with which the manager can eval-
uate the ability of employees at each ”dimension” -arrival time, leaving time-
depends on the manager’s own ”ability” in that dimension.
Similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect
Given any two employees with the same total productivity, the manager will
tend to believe that the one who has a schedule closer to her own one is more
productive. Let us …rst consider the extreme case where the manager’s m type
is such that she is the …rst to arrive in the morning [am = a] and the time of her
departure will be at some moment between d and d. Given that she is the …rst to
arrive at work, she can tell perfectly how early all the employees arrive. However,
with respect to the departure time, she will only know the exact departure
time of those who leave earlier than her. For every employee who stays longer,
given that she knows that arrival and departure times are independent, her best
guess will be that any employee remaining will be staying until the mid point
between the moment the manager leaves and the closing time
³
dm+d
2
´
. This
is, given any employee i staying later than the manager, she will estimate his
total productivity to be equal to Em (qi) = Em [k (di ¡ ai)] = k [Em (di) ¡ ai] =
k
³
dm+d
2 ¡ ai
´
, where the index m indicates the identity of the evaluator. Given
any two equally productive employees i and j (di ¡ ai = dj ¡ aj) who leave
later than the manager -otherwise there would be error in the evaluation- it
easily follows that the manager will tend to give a higher evaluation to that
employee whose pro…le is more similar to her own, in this case the one arriving
the earliest in the morning
h
ai < aj ) q(m)i > q(m)j
i
. A similar argument could
be also developed for any type of manager.
Group discrimination
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Now imagine that both managers and employees can belong to two di¤erent
groups, Northerners and Southerners, and that group belonging is easily ob-
servable. Let us assume that on average members of both groups tend to work
the same number of hours but, while people from the North tend both to arrive
early at work and leave early, those from the South are more likely to arrive late
and remain longer. In particular, let arrival and departure times be uniformly
distributed such that
8i²G; ai ! u
¡
aG; aG
¢
& di ! u
³
dG; d
G
´
where G = N;S, aN < aS , aN ¡ aN = aS ¡ aS , dN < dS and dN ¡ dN =
d
S ¡ dS
Following the above reasoning, if group-belonging was not observable, the
manager will tend give a higher evaluation to that candidate who has a schedule
closer to her own. Given two equally good employees, one Southerner and one
Northerner, since people from the same group tend to have a closer schedule,
the employee who belongs to the same group as the manager will tend to receive
a higher evaluation.
Without loss of generality instance consider again the case of a manager who
arrives earliest in the morning to the o¢ce and who, in this context, happens to
be from the North. If she has to has to evaluate two equally productive workers,
one from the North and one from the South, the observed expected productivity
of each candidate will be given by Em (qi) = k
µ
dm+
¹dN+ ¹dS
2
2 ¡ ai
¶
. Given that
E (ai=i 2 N) < E (ai=i 2 S), then Em (qi=i²N) > Em (qi=i²S)
This is, since the manager, who also is from the North, arrives early in the
morning and can only observe the time of arrival but not of departure, she
will tend to estimate that the most productive employee is the one who arrives
early, who most likely will be the one belonging to her own group. This is,
the existence of a similar-to-me-in-skills e¤ect implies that when the evaluation
cannot be conditioned on group belonging group discrimination will arise.
However, if the manager was aware of these group di¤erences and she was
allowed to take them into account then not only would her evaluation be more
accurate but also group discrimination would disappear. The expected pro-
ductivity of each candidate would be: Em (qi=i 2 G) = k
³
dm+d
G
2
¡ ai
´
where
G = fN;Sg.
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Table 1: Contestants’ characteristics
Mean Std. dev. Minimun Maximun
Female 0.460 0.499 0 1
Age 36.803 12.295 18 74
By gender-age
Young female 0.291 0.455 0 1
Old female 0.168 0.374 0 1
Young male 0.254 0.435 0 1
Old male 0.287 0.453 0 1
By education
Primary 0.190 0.392 0 1
Secondary 0.223 0.417 0 1
College 0.370 0.483 0 1
Student 0.141 0.349 0 1
Not known 0.076 0.264 0 1
Notes: The database contains information on 927 players.
Young (old) refers to individuals who are 36 or younger
(above 36).
Table 2: Performance
Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Percentage of correct answers 0.59 0.28 0 1
Observed performance 0.60 0.29 0 1
Observed performance with group priors 0.00 0.29 -0.80 0.57
Notes: The database contains information on 927 players. ”Observed performance”
and ”Observed performance with group priors” have been computed as indicated
in equations (7) and (8) of the text, respectively, which take into account infor-
mation on both the voting and potential voted players. As each day there are nine
contestants, each of them facing eight potential voting decisions, these variables
have been calculated across the 7416 possible pairs of players.
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Table 3: Distribution of contestants according to the number of questions asked
and the number of questions answered correctly
Number of questions answered correctly
0 1 2 3 4 Total
2 4 5 2 - - 11
Number of (0.43) (0.54) (0.22) - - (1.19)
questions 3 52 196 293 136 - 677
received (5.61) (21.14) (31.61) (14.67) - (73.03)
4 10 34 73 82 40 239
(1.08) (3.67) (7.87) (8.85) (4.31) (25.78)
Total 66 235 368 218 40 927
(7.12) (25.35) (39.70) (23.52) (4.31) (100)
Notes: Percentage values in parenthesis. The time assigned to the round
is …xed and not all players receive the same number of questions.
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Table 4: Performance and votes received by gender, age and education
Correct answers (%) Votes received N
(1) (2) (3)
By gender
Female 0.573 1.099 426
(0.014) (0.085)
Male 0.606 0.916 501
(0.012) (0.066)
By age
Young 0.588 0.891 505
(0.013) (0.070)
Old 0.595 1.130 422
(0.013) (0.081)
By gender-age
Young female 0.568 0.893 270
(0.018) (0.095)
Old female 0.581 1.455 156
(0.024) (0.160)
Young male 0.610 0.889 235
(0.019) (0.102)
Old male 0.602 0.940 266
(0.016) (0.087)
By education
Primary 0.591 1.273 176
(0.021) (0.145)
Secondary 0.564 1.072 207
(0.020) (0.113)
College 0.622 0.746 343
(0.015) (0.070)
Student 0.588 0.855 131
(0.025) (0.141)
Not known 0.518 1.614 70
(0.034) (0.228)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ”% correct answers” represents
the performance of contestants in the corresponding category in round 1.
”Votes received” is the average number of votes cast for players in the
speci…ed group in round 1. Each player receives, on average, one vote.
Young (old) players are those who are 36 or younger (above 36).
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Table 5: Performance by group and type of question
Overall Young female Old female Young male Old male Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Art 0.600 0.569 0 .541 0.667 0.632 0.061
(0.036) (0.066) (0.083) (0.083 ) (0.064) (0.004)
Children 0.727 0.808 0.467 0.875 0.652 0.029
(0.048) (0.079) (0.133) (0.069) (0.102) (0.003)
Cinema 0.503 0.485 0.394 0.565 0.563 0.059
(0.038) (0.062) (0.086) (0.074) (0.089) (0.004)
Communication 0.590 0.592 0.517 0.639 0.596 0.055
(0.038) (0.071) (0.094) (0.081) (0.069) (0.004)
Custom 0.613 0.571 0.667 0.444 0.731 0.031
(0.051) (0.095) (0.105) (0.121) (0.089) (0.003)
Entertainment 0.647 0.000¤ 0.600 0.875 0.500¤ 0.006
(0.119) - (0.245) (0.125) (0.500) (0.001)
Famous people 0.598 0.591 0.632 0.622 0.552 0.036
(0.048) (0.107) (0.114) (0.081) (0.094) (0.003)
Fashion 0.635 0.704 0.846 0.611 0.481 0.028
(0.053) (0.090) (0.104) (0.118) (0.098) (0.003)
Gastronomy 0.565 0.607 0.684 0.438 0.500 0.028
(0.054) (0.094) (0.110) (0.128) (0.109) (0.003)
Geography 0.609 0.585 0.548 0.702 0.605 0.076
(0.032) (0.062) (0.078) (0.067) (0.056) (0.005)
History 0.544 0.385 0.559 0.569 0.710 0.079
(0.032) (0.055) (0.086) (0.062) (0.058) (0.005)
Language 0.554 0.533 0.517 0.571 0.579 0.055
(0.039) (0.075) (0.094) (0.085) (0.066) (.004)
Literature 0.525 0.529 0.528 0.444 0.589 0.080
(0.032) (0.061) (0.084) (0.063) (0.058) (0.005)
Music 0.539 0.632 0.500 0.639 0.359 0.080
(0.032) (0.056) (0.080) (0.062) (0.060) (0.005)
Politics 0.629 0.588 0.692 0.550 0.700 0.023
(0.058) (0.123) (0.133) (0.114) (0.105) (0.003)
Religion 0.602 0.533 0.800 0.538 0.706 0.028
(0.054) (0.093) (0.133) (0.100) (0.114) (0.003)
Science 0.631 0.543 0.732 0.612 0.663 0.104
(0.027) (0.056) (0.060) (0.053) (0.050) (0.006)
Sports 0.710 0.636 0.633 0.797 0.707 0.080
(0.029) (0.065) (0.089) (0.047) (0.051) (0.005)
Television 0.353 0.500 1.000¤ 0.250 0.500 0.006
(0.119) (0.289) - (0.164) (0.289) (0.001)
Traveling 0.618 0.630 0.577 0.588 0.667 0.055
(0.038) (0.072) (0.099) (0.070) (0.074) (0.004)
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. Figures in the table correspond to the 3009 questions
that were asked in round 1. Young (Old) refers to players who are 36 or younger (above 36).
An asterisk signals three cells with 2 or less observations. Not all of …elds turn up with
the same frequency. Share is the proportion of questions on each …eld.
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Table 6: Voting behaviour: estimates of conditional logits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Old female 0.397*** 0.446*** 0.471*** 0.445***
(0.130) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138)
Young male -0.011 -0.020 -0.024 -0.025
(0.120) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128)
Young female -0.727*** -0.743*** -0.719*** -0.741***
(0.172) (0.181) (0.181) (0.183)
Secondary -0.236* -0.246* -0.242* -0.253*
(0.124) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129)
College -0.322*** -0.289** -0.283** -0.301**
(0.119) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
Student -0.320** -0.248 -0.257** -0.245
(0.154) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162)
Not known 0.062 0.060 0.044 0.061
(0.160) (0.170) (0.169) (0.169)
Distance 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.177***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
% correct questions -4.434*** -3.146*** -3.097*** -4.402***
(0.172) (0.594) (0.530) (0.178)
Observed performance -1.246**
(0.572)
Observed performance -1.337**
with group priors (0.520)
Same group 0.050
(0.096)
Pseudo R2 0.2915 0.3053 0.3059 0.3040
Field Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7416 7416 7416 7416
Notes: robust standard errors in parenthesis. In round one each player
faces eight potential voting decisions, so there are 7416 possible pairs of
potential voting-voted players. All regressions include dummies for
position and for the number of questions received. Young (old) refers
to players who are 36 or younger (above36). The omitted category is a
male, older than 36 with primary education, who answered 2 questions
and was located in position one. ”Observed performance” and ”Observed
performance with group priors” are computed as indicated in equations (5)
and (6), respectively.
*, **, *** indicate signi…cance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 7: Is observed performance higher when the evaluator and the candidate
belong to the same age-gender group? OLS estimates
(1) (2)
% correct questions 0.997***
(0.002)
Same group 0.005** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Individual dummies No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.935 0.941
Number of observations 7416 7416
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is
”observed performance”. Both regressions include dummy
variables for the evaluator. Same group is equal to 1 if both
the evaluator and the candidate belong to the same age and
gender group.
*, **, *** indicate signi…cance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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